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GENERAL E/CN.4/1999/WG.1/BP.10
26 February 1999
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COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Fifth-fifth session
Sessional open-ended working group
to review and formulate proposals
for the World Conference against
Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance
The definitions of racial discrimination
Background paper prepared by Mr. Ion Diaconu, member of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,*
in accordance with paragraph 51 of Commission resolution 1998/26
Definition of discrimination in different fields
1. It is well known that the word "discrimination" is not used in the United Nations Charter or in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While trying to define its own mandate, the newly born Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities started with the view that "Prevention of discrimination is the prevention of any action which denies to individuals or groups of people equality of treatment which they may wish". Developing the concept, the Secretary-General's Memorandum on The Main Types and Causes of Discrimination of 1949 is distinguishing moral and juridical equality from material equality, in the sense that industriousness deserves reward, but differentiations on such grounds as colour, race, sex, language should be excluded. According to this Memorandum, "Discriminatory practices are those detrimental distinctions which do not take account of the particular characteristics of an individual as such, but take into account only collective qualifications deriving from his membership in a certain social or other group ... Discrimination might be defined as a detrimental distinction based on grounds which may not be attributed to the individual and which have no justified consequences in social, political, or legal relations (colour, race, sex, etc.), or on grounds of membership in social categories (cultural, language, religious, political or other opinion, national circle, social origin, social class, property, birth, or other status). Three forms of discrimination are foreseen in the Memorandum, as inequality in treatment: imposing disabilities, granting privileges and imposing odious obligations. 1/
2. In international treaties, the first definition of discrimination is that adopted by the International Labour Organization in its Convention (No. 111) concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation of 1958. According to this Convention, discrimination includes "any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation", as well as other such distinction, exclusion or preference, having the same effect, as may be determined by a member State after consultation with representative employers' and workers' organizations.
3. A more elaborated definition was given by the Convention against Discrimination in Education, adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in 1960. For the purposes of this Convention, discrimination includes "any distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference, which, being based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic condition or birth, has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality of treatment in education, and in particular:
(a) Of depriving any person or group of persons of access to education of any type or at any level;
(b) Of limiting any person or group of persons to education of an inferior standard;
(c) Subject to the provisions of article 2 of this Convention (which stipulates the conditions for establishing separate educational systems or institutions, public and private, for religious or linguistic reasons, when permitted in a State), of establishing or maintaining separate educational systems or institutions for persons or groups of persons;
(d) Of inflicting on any person or group of persons conditions which are incompatible with the dignity of man."
4. Although containing many provisions on discrimination, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights neither defines the term "discrimination" nor indicates what constitutes discrimination. In its General Comment 18 (Non-discrimination), adopted in 1989, the Human Rights Committee formulates the view that this term, as used in the Covenant, should be understood to imply "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms". 2/
5. More recently, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women defines, for its purposes, discrimination against women as meaning "any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field".
6. In the same vein, the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief defines the expression "intolerance and discrimination, based on religion or belief" as meaning any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis.
Definition of racial discrimination
7. As known, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1963, is not attempting to give a definition to racial discrimination.
8. Such a definition is given by the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, according to which racial discrimination "shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life".
9. The same first article of the Convention is stipulating, for the purposes of this Convention, some limits to the definition. First, the Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions, preferences made by a State party between citizens and non-citizens. Second, the Convention should not be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality.
10. And finally, special measures, taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals, in order to ensure them equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms, shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided that such measures do not lead to separate rights for different racial groups and are not continued after the objectives pursued have been achieved.
11. At the same time, the definition has to be examined in connection with all other provisions of the Convention. This is the consequence of the requirement to interpret the provisions of the Convention in their context, in the light of the object and the purpose of the Convention, 3/ and to give all its provisions a useful effect.
12. Thus, one has to consider that the Convention is aiming at eliminating all forms of racial discrimination, although the United Nations bodies could not agree on enumerating some of its forms, when they elaborated the text. 4/
13. States parties are committing themselves to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination, against persons, groups of persons or institutions; they have to ensure that all public authorities and institutions, national and local, act in conformity with this obligation; they undertake to prohibit and bring to an end by all appropriate means, including legislation, racial discrimination by any person, group or organization, to condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of racial superiority, to declare an offence and to punish the dissemination of such ideas, the incitement to racial discrimination; they also undertook to prohibit and to guarantee to everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, the right to equality before the law in the enjoyment of a long list, non-exhaustive, of human rights; they also have to assure to everyone effective protection and remedies against any acts of racial discrimination.
14. Second, in considering the definition of racial discrimination, it is necessary, in accordance with the rules of interpretation of treaties, 5/ to take into account the whole system of international documents on human rights.
15. Particularly relevant in this respect are the provisions of the two international Covenants on human rights, adopted in 1966, almost identical, by which States parties undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated by the two Covenants will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to, among others, race, colour, language, national origin, birth or other status. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates clearly that this concerns all individuals within the territory of a State party and subject to its jurisdiction. Article 24 of the same Covenant adds that the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, language, national origin, birth or other status. Most of the provisions of the two Covenants refer to the rights of "everyone", to all persons, and very seldom to "citizens".
Features of the definition
16 The definition of racial discrimination, as given by the Convention, is based on objective elements; it involves any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference; that means, one has to identify an appropriate comparator; as they are based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin, the comparator is given by reference to persons of a different race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin. By this enumeration the definition is suitable to protect all persons, as well as racial or ethnic groups. We note however that the definition does not deal with religious grounds of discrimination, or religious groups to be protected. It is obvious that purely religious discrimination is not covered by the Convention, but racial discrimination disguised as discrimination on religious grounds is not permissible.
17. These concepts are nevertheless not very clearly defined and strictly distinct from each other; the term "descent", which is not found in any other international document and was suggested by India during the elaboration of the Convention, does not indicate in what way it is different from "national" or "ethnic origin"; some scholars commented that it would include the notion of "castes"; others, that it should indeed add something, because it cannot be easily subsumed under the concepts of national or ethnic origin. 6/ There is, certainly, an overlapping between "national origin" and "ethnic origin" although the former seems be a narrower term than the latter. It is difficult to accept the opinion that these terms would cover distinctions both on the ground of present or previous nationality in the ethnographical sense, and on the ground of previous nationality, in the sense of citizenship. 7/ As a matter of fact, no case of discrimination on grounds of a previous citizenship, without involving the grounds of ethnic or national origin, was presented in the more than 25 years of activity of the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). It seems rather that the definition was composed by adding as many concepts as possible, in order to avoid any lacunae, as it is the case in other documents on human rights.
18. In order to qualify as racial discrimination, a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference has to be detrimental to human rights.
19. According to the definition, it has to have either the purpose or the effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
20. As CERD noted in one of its general recommendations, this is confirmed by the obligation placed upon States parties by article 2, paragraph 1 (c), to nullify any law or practice which has the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination. 8/ In considering many reports presented by States parties to the Convention, the Committee stressed that States have to take into account not only the purpose of different acts, that is the deliberate and obvious intent, but also the effect of discrimination which they entail on the exercise or the enjoyment of human rights. Another fundamental element of the definition,
closely related to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights, is the "equal footing"; having identified the comparator, one has to examine the treatment applied to persons or groups taken into account.
21. The definition refers to "the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life".
22. The enumeration seems to be comprehensive, referring to fields, but reminding in fact categories of rights enshrined in the Covenants (if one assumes that a clear distinction between civil and political rights was never made in the activity of the Human Rights Committee and the practice of States), that is includes the whole spectrum of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In the definition given to discrimination in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women the "civil" field is expressly included; the definition given by the Human Rights Committee, mentioned above, refers to "all rights and freedoms". There is no reason to believe that "civil" rights, whatever they are, should be excluded from the ambit of the definition of racial discrimination. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination enumerates in its article 5 as "political" rights only the participation in elections, in the Government and in the conduct of public affairs, as well as equal access to public service, and then, as "other civil rights", a long list of rights, among which the freedom of movement and residence, the right to leave any country, including one's own, the right to nationality, to marriage and choice of spouse, to property, to inherit, the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and association. Many of the rights enumerated as "civil" are highly political and could hardly be separated from the participation in the conduct of public affairs.
23. What is important here is the category of "civil" rights and the long enumeration included; this means that the "civil" field is in no way excluded from the definition given in article 1 (1), although it is not expressly mentioned.
24. On the other side, the reference to "fields", rather than categories of rights, makes it that the scope of the rights to be protected against racial discrimination as against discrimination in general, is not limited to the categories of rights enshrined in the international documents. The corpus of rules of non-discrimination are prohibiting such discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated and protected by public authorities. 9/ In other words, even when a State is granting more rights than those provided for in international documents, or is creating better conditions for their exercise, in any regulation of human activities or relationships, it is obliged not to discriminate, that is to make no distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference, having the purpose or the effect of nullifying or imparing the recognition, the enjoyment or exercise on an equal footing of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
25. The reference to "public life" at the end of the enumeration raised already some difficulties of interpretation. Some States have given it a restrictive sense, meaning that what could be considered as "private life", would not be included in the ambit of the definition of racial discrimination. The United States of America formulated recently, when ratifying the Convention, a reservation according to which "To the extent ... that the Convention calls for a broader regulation of private conduct, the U.S. does not accept any obligation under this Convention to enact legislation or take other measures ... with respect to private conduct except as mandated by the Constitution and laws of the United States". This reservation is motivated by the fact that individual privacy and freedom from governmental interference in private conduct are also recognized as among the fundamental values of a free and democratic society and that the United States understands the reference to "fields of public life" in article 1 as reflecting a similar distinction between spheres of public conduct that are customarily the subject of governmental regulation and spheres of private conduct that are not. 10/
26. As noted above, the Convention on the Elimination of All Discrimination against Women refers to "all fields" and the Human Rights Committee avoids this issue, referring to all rights and freedoms, in their definitions of discrimination.
27. For its part, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination relates the reference to the political, economic, social and cultural fields to the related rights and freedoms set up in article 5 of the Convention. 11/ In a more direct approach, in its General Recommendation XX on article 5, the Committee states that "The rights and freedoms referred to in article 5 of the Convention and any similar
rights shall be protected by a State Party. Such protection may be achieved in different ways, be it by the use of public institutions or through the activities of private institutions." And the CERD concludes "To the extent that private institutions influence the exercise of rights or the availability of opportunities, the State Party must ensure that the result has neither the purpose nor the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination". 12/
28. It is well accepted that most of the rights mentioned in article 5 of the Convention (and the enumeration is not exhaustive, which is the meaning of the word "notably") are usually subject of governmental regulation; of course, some aspects of the exercise of some rights remain part of the sphere of private conduct (choice of spouse, choice of the associate). But what the Convention is asking States parties to do, is not to regulate more or less, to give more rights or less rights, but to eliminate racial discrimination and to guarantee the right of everyone to equality before the law.
29. The reference to "public life" in the definition, understood in its logical relationship with other provisions of the Convention, mainly article 5, does not mean to leave opened for racial discrimination such areas of human activities, where this would infringe upon the enjoyment and exercise on equal footing of human rights and freedoms as provided for in international documents and in national laws.
30. It is largely demonstrated that even the concept of "public" life is in a constant evolution, that States are regulating more and deeper different aspects of human conduct and that the issues of equal rights and non-discrimination are increasingly of a public interest.
31. Another important issue is the sphere of persons to which the definition, that is the concept of racial discrimination, would apply. According to article 1 (2) the Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made between citizens and non-citizens. Related to this, the Convention reserves to the States their legislation on nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that it does not discriminate against any particular nationality.
32. In this respect, while noting the provisions of the Convention, CERD affirms that these provisions must not be interpreted to detract in any way from the rights and freedoms recognized and enunciated in other instruments on human rights. 13/ From a different angle, the Committee states that whenever a State imposes a restriction upon one of the rights listed in article 5 which applies ostensibly to all within its jurisdiction, "it must ensure that neither in purpose nor effect is the restriction incompatible with article 1 of the Convention as an integral part of international human rights standards". And the Committee continues "Many of the rights and freedoms mentioned in article 5, such as the right to equal treatment before tribunals, are to be enjoyed by all persons living in a given State; others such as the right to participate in elections, to vote and to stand for election are the rights of citizens". 14/ The Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment 18 (Non-Discrimination) draws the attention to the provisions of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, according to which States have to respect and ensure to all persons within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, national or social origin, birth or other status; even in time of public emergency, when States are allowed to take measures derogating from certain obligations under the Covenant, such measures should not involve discrimination solely on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. 15/ In its General Comment 15 (The position of aliens under the Covenant), the Human Rights Committee notes that "In general, the rights set forth in the Covenant apply to everyone, irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of his or her nationality or statelessness" and that "the general rule is that each one of the rights of the Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens". 16/
33. In the actual practice, different categories of non-citizens found at one moment on a territory of a State enjoy different treatment; those permanently residing have usually a permit of work and of stay and enjoy most of the economic, social and cultural rights as the citizens; in some countries, they enjoy even some political rights (to vote for local elections, to occupy some public functions); those temporarily residing, for business, tourism or other purposes, also enjoy some rights, equally to any other person, like the right to life, the right to personal security, the freedom of movement, the right to leave any country and others, although they may not enjoy some economic and social rights and certainly not the political rights related to citizenship. These different degrees of treatment are not based on race, colour, ethnic or national origin, but on objective facts of connection with the respective State.
34. It seems that the areas where a State is justified to make distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences between citizens and non-citizens living on its territory and under its jurisdiction are limited, in accordance with the international standards on human rights.
35. This makes it necessary to interpret provisions of article 1 (2) of the Convention in the context of all its provisions and in the context of other provisions of international treaties on the similar issue of non-discrimination.
36. As for the provisions of article 1 (3), on nationality, citizenship or naturalization, the regulation of these issues is reserved to the State, provided that such regulation is not discriminating against any particular nationality. The meaning of "nationality" is unclear, though, being used along with "citizenship", it should mean something different, that is belonging to an ethnic or national group, if this issue is regulated by the State. It appears certain that a person cannot be deprived of his or her right to nationality (this time, in the sense of citizenship), on grounds of race, colour, or national origin in accordance with the provision of article 5 d (iii) and in the light of article 9 of the 1961 Convention on the reduction of statelessness, according to which a contracting State may not deprive any person or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds. 17/ It is also clear that any regulation on nationality, citizenship, naturalization should not discriminate on grounds of nationality, that is national or ethnic origin.
37. As for the special measures which should not be considered racial discrimination, the issue is related to the equal treatment and to the comparator, already mentioned. Article 1 (4) of the Convention is considered to be a development of the definition of discrimination, given by the Convention. 18/ It is complemented by article 2 (2), in terms of obligations taken by States to adopt such measures.
38. As the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination observed, a differentiation of treatment will not constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged against the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are legitimate or fall within the scope of article 1, paragraph 4, of the Convention; and the Committee continues, saying that it will look to see whether a particular action has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin, in order to determine if such an action has an effect contrary to the Convention. 19/ For its part, the Human Rights Committee states that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing does not mean identical treatment in every instance and that not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant. 20/
39. These special measures are treated by most of the scholars as "affirmative" or "positive" action. 21/ Their aim is always equality. Asbjøorn Eide, in his report on "solutions to problems involving minorities" describes affirmative action as "preference, by way of special measures, for certain groups or members of such groups (typically defined by race, ethnic identity or sex) for the purpose of securing adequate advancement of such groups or their individual members in order to ensure equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms". 22/
40. It is expressly provided for, and generally accepted, that such measures are limited in scope - for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary, in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and in time - they should not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved, and should not lead to the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups. Otherwise, they lead to the violation of the very rule they are meant to ensure the implementation of -equal rights and non-discrimination - and could lead to group conflict. 23/
41. In this connection, one has to understand correctly the relationships between the definition of racial discrimination and the rights of persons belonging to minorities. It is obvious that, by its reference to race, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin, the definition is covering persons belonging to national, ethnic and linguistic minorities, which means that all the provisions of the Convention are to be applied to them and they are protected against racial discrimination.
42. It is also obvious that minority groups or persons belonging to minorities can be the beneficiaries of special measures, under the conditions mentioned. But it is also recognized that special measures of this kind are not sufficient for covering the issues raised regarding the exercise of the rights of persons belonging to minorities to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language. 24/ The exercise of these rights requires permanent measures taken by States, as for the exercise of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, by all persons. 25/ They are different from the special or "affirmative" measures; that is why the Human Rights Committee is calling them not special, not affirmative, but "positive" measures of protection, as an answer to the negative terms in which the respective rights are formulated in article 27 of the Covenant. 26/
Conclusions
43. The definition of racial discrimination by the Convention is a broad and comprehensive one.
44. It is presenting racial discrimination as a human conduct, by public authorities and institutions, by organizations and persons, which has to be eliminated. It is protecting all persons, but also racial or ethnic groups; persons are protected against racial discrimination irrespective of their belonging to such groups, whether or not such groups are recognized by the respective State. The reference to groups is an expression of the reality that very often racial discrimination is affecting groups of persons belonging to the same race or ethnic origin, but the existence or the recognition of such groups is not required.
45. The philosophy of the definition is integrationist, in the sense of promoting the elimination of barriers between races and groups, of preventing separate rights for different racial groups, of condemning and eliminating racial segregation.
46. At the same time, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination is very often underlying the distinction which has to be made between integration and forceful assimilation.
47. The definition is not without lacunae and, as it was proved, is not giving an answer to all practical questions. It is not very clearly stating that the authors of acts of discrimination can be the State bodies, but also non-governmental organizations and associations, and individuals. The terms used in various articles of the Convention are different and do not offer a uniform approach to this issue. The postulate of not applying the Convention to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences between citizens and non-citizens does not correspond to the state of international and internal law, where the difference of treatment between citizens and for instance, non-citizens permanently residing on the territory of a State, is minimal and reducing. The reference to "public life" is misleading, after the enumeration of almost all fields of human relationships, while most of these issues are regulated both in internal legislation of States and in international law and enumerated in article 5, which is requesting States to guarantee the equality as to race, colour, or national, or ethnic origin, in the enjoyment of the respective human rights.
48. Thus, the definition of racial discrimination given in article 1 of the Convention, has to be understood and interpreted in the context of other provisions of the Convention and in the light of other international instruments on human rights, of the practice of international bodies involved in their implementation.
Notes:
1/ Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/40/Rev.1/1949, paras. 16, 87-89.
2/ Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, document HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3 of 15 August 1997, p. 28, para. 7.
3/ Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, article 31 (1), document A/CONF.39/27.
4/ For a presentation of different forms proposed and the debate, see Michael Banton, International Action Against Racial Discrimination, 1996, pp. 59-62.
5/ Vienna Convention, article 31 (3).
6/ Cf. Patrick Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities, 1991, pp. 261-262.
7/ Opinion formulated by E. Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in International Comparative Law Quarterly, 1966, p. 1007.
8/ General Recommendation XIV on article 1, para. 1 of the Convention, adopted in 1993, in Compilation ..., document HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3 of 15 August 1997, p. 108.
9/ General Comment 18 (Non-discrimination) of the Human Rights Committee, document HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3 of 15 August 1997, p. 29, para. 12.
10/ Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, Status as at 31 December 1995, ST/LEG/SER.E/14, p. 102.
11/ General Recommendation XIV on article 1, paragraph 1 of the Convention mentioned, document HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3, p. 108, para. 3.
12/ Ibid., p. 113, para. 5.
13/ Ibid., p. 106, General Recommendation XI on non-citizens, paras. 2 and 3.
14/ Ibid., p. 113, paras. 2 and 3.
15/ Document HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3, p. 26, paras. 1 and 2.
16/ Ibid., p. 19, paras. 1 and 2.
17/ Patrick Thornberry, op. cit., p. 263; document A/CONF.9/15 (1961), text in Ian Brownlie, Basic Documents on Human Rights, p. 83.
18/ Patrick Thornberry, op. cit., p. 265.
19/ General Recommendation XIV on article 1, paragraph 1 of the Convention, document HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3, p. 108, para. 2.
20/ General Comment 18 (Non-discrimination), document HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3, pp. 28 and 29, paras. 8 and 13.
21/ See Athanasia Spiliopoulou Akermark, Justification of Minority Protection in International Law, 1997, pp. 25-28.
22/ A. Eide, Protection of Minorities: Possible ways and means of facilitating the peaceful and constructive solution of problems involving minorities, United Nations document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34, para. 172.
23/ Ibid., para. 184.
24/ A.S. Akermark, op. cit., pp. 26-28.
25/ Human Rights Committee, General Comment 23 on article 27, document HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3, p. 41, paras. 6.1, 6.2 and 9.
26/ General Comment 23 (art. 27), document HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3, p. 41, paras. 6.1 and 6.2.
* This background paper expresses the individual views of the author, and has not been approved by and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Committee.